Surgical Strikes: Reinforcing Deterrence in South Asia
The geopolitical situation in South Asia has been heavily influenced by the complex relationship between India and Pakistan. These two nuclear-armed neighbors have a history of conflicts, territorial disputes, and ongoing tensions. As of January 1, 2019, the region still faces the challenge of maintaining deterrence stability amid unequal threats. A major event that has sparked considerable debate among scholars, policymakers, and security experts is India’s announcement of surgical strikes along the Line of Control (LoC) in September 2016. This military action was a calculated response to a terrorist attack on an Indian Army base in Uri. It aimed to address low-level threats without escalating into a full-scale conflict. This editorial will examine the nature, goals, and broader implications of these strikes, drawing on established theories of deterrence and real-world evidence from South Asian crises. The intent is to shed light on how such actions might help maintain, rather than undermine, the delicate balance of nuclear deterrence in the region.
To grasp the importance of these surgical strikes, it is necessary to understand the idea of deterrence stability in South Asia. Deterrence stability is when nuclear-armed rivals are discouraged from starting a conflict because of the mutual understanding that devastating retaliation will follow. In South Asia, this stability became more pronounced after both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998. Before this, the two countries had fought several conventional wars—in 1947, 1965, and 1971—each escalating from border disputes. The introduction of nuclear weapons changed this game, creating a threshold where escalation could lead to disastrous outcomes. However, this stability is not guaranteed; it is often described as fragile due to factors like geographical closeness, unresolved issues such as Kashmir, and differences in conventional military strength.
Critics of proliferation argue that South Asia’s deterrence is fundamentally weak. For example, biases within military organizations, especially in Pakistan, where the army has significant control over nuclear assets, might lead to mistakes or unauthorized actions. Additionally, short-sightedness among leaders—where they fail to foresee the long-term effects of their decisions—poses risks. The stability-instability paradox adds to the complexity: nuclear weapons can stop large-scale wars while encouraging lower-level conflicts, such as sub-conventional warfare, under the assumption that the opponent won't escalate to a nuclear level. In this environment, Pakistan's alleged support for militant groups operating in Kashmir and elsewhere is seen as a way to challenge India without entering conventional warfare. India, viewing itself as conventionally dominant, has traditionally looked for military responses that remain below Pakistan’s nuclear limits.
Both countries have adopted different nuclear strategies, adding to this complexity. India’s approach is based on minimum credible deterrence with a no-first-use policy, focusing on assured retaliation. In contrast, Pakistan has shifted to a strategy of asymmetric escalation, maintaining the option for first use, especially through tactical nuclear weapons aimed at addressing limited conventional threats. This shift was formalized in Pakistan's full-spectrum deterrence policy announced in 2013, aiming to counter various threats from low-level conflicts to strategic dangers. These strategies create a multi-layered deterrence framework but also increase the chances of misinterpretation and rapid escalation during crises.
Evidence from post-1998 conflicts supports the view of deterrence stability, despite its instability. The Kargil conflict in 1999, when Pakistani forces crossed into Indian territory, ended without escalating to nuclear confrontation, partly due to international intervention and mutual fears of nuclear escalation. Similarly, the 2001-2002 standoff after the attack on the Indian Parliament saw large troop movements but no full-scale war, with diplomatic efforts playing a crucial role in de-escalation. These incidents illustrate how nuclear weapons have instilled restraint, preventing the kind of extensive conventional wars seen in earlier years. Yet, they also reveal underlying instability: Pakistan's capacity to pursue its goals through proxies without facing serious repercussions has shifted the status quo in its favor, leading India to seek new response options.
In this context, India’s surgical strikes in September 2016 require careful analysis. On September 18, 2016, militants attacked an Indian Army brigade in Uri, Jammu and Kashmir, killing 19 soldiers. Intelligence linked these attackers to groups based in Pakistan. In response, on September 29, 2016, India’s Director General of Military Operations announced that the Indian Army had carried out targeted strikes on terrorist launch pads across the LoC in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. These operations involved elite commandos who crossed the LoC, neutralized threats, and returned without prolonged fighting. The strikes were characterized as precise, limited in scope, and aimed at preventing imminent infiltrations.
What stands out about these strikes is their mixed nature: they were openly acknowledged by the Indian government but executed covertly, resembling special operations instead of conventional military attacks. Unlike a full-scale invasion or limited war plans like Cold Start, which suggest rapid but shallow advances by combined forces, these strikes avoided mobilizing large units or using heavy artillery and air support, minimizing the chances of being seen as an existential threat to Pakistan and reducing the risk of escalation.
To understand the wider implications of this event, consider the various types of conflict in international relations. Conflicts can be viewed as a spectrum, ranging from sub-conventional actions like terrorism and insurgency to conventional warfare and nuclear conflict. Surgical strikes represent a unique category of what might be called “asymmetric conventional” actions—operations sanctioned by the state that cause targeted damage without seeking territorial gains or prolonged military engagement. Such tactics have historical precedence around the world; for example, the United States' Operation Neptune Spear in 2011, which eliminated Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, showed how precision strikes can achieve goals while managing the risks of escalation. In South Asia, while India suggests previous covert operations across the LoC, the public acknowledgment of the 2016 strikes introduced a political dimension, signaling resolve while avoiding provocation.
The reasons behind these strikes were varied. Their primary aim was to neutralize immediate threats. Intelligence indicated a rise in militant activity along the LoC, with plans for infiltrations into Jammu and Kashmir and possibly deeper into India. By preemptively targeting these sites, India aimed to disrupt potential attacks and improve border security. Reports claim that the operations destroyed several launch pads and caused casualties among militants and their supporters, though the exact figures remain unclear.
A secondary goal was punitive: to impose costs on Pakistan for its perceived involvement in sub-conventional warfare. This aligns with deterrence theory, where punishment discourages future aggression by illustrating consequences. Following the Uri attack, internal pressure in India increased for a response, spurred by media and political discussions. The strikes allowed the government to project strength, easing public anger and boosting national morale. Politically, they were used in domestic narratives, although this editorial maintains neutrality by noting that such actions are common in democracies where leaders respond to public sentiment.
Thirdly, the strikes aimed to act as a deterrent against ongoing proxy actions. By briefly crossing the LoC, India indicated that it would respond to sub-conventional threats, potentially reshaping Pakistan's risk calculations. This fits into India's long-standing search for response options below nuclear thresholds. The Cold Start doctrine, proposed in the early 2000s, was an earlier attempt to facilitate limited conventional strikes but faced challenges due to Pakistan's tactical nuclear developments. Surgical strikes, being even more restrained, provide a lower-risk alternative.
Assessing the effectiveness of the strikes requires a balanced view. Immediately, they seemed successful in disrupting near-term threats, evidenced by a noticeable reduction in major infiltrations after the operation. However, measuring long-term impacts is difficult due to the secretive nature of intelligence. Regarding punishment, the damage to Pakistan was minor—estimated at little financial or structural cost compared to its larger investments in militancy. Still, the political and reputational repercussions were significant. International reactions varied: major powers like the United States and Russia supported counter-terrorism efforts but urged restraint, while China expressed concerns about rising tensions. Neighboring countries like Bangladesh and Afghanistan backed India's right to self-defense. Pakistan's dismissal of the strikes as mere border firing did not gain much international support, indirectly harming its image as a backer of terrorism.
Domestically in India, the strikes enhanced the government’s standing, benefiting political narratives in subsequent elections. However, this success must be viewed critically; an over-reliance on such operations could politicize military actions, potentially creating escalation pressures in future crises.
As for deterrence, the effect of the strikes on Pakistan's sub-conventional strategy is still unclear. Pakistan's denials allowed it to avoid domestic backlash, maintaining support for its proxy groups. Figures like Hafiz Saeed continued to use inflammatory rhetoric, indicating no immediate change in policy. Historically, sub-conventional warfare in South Asia predates the nuclear era and is rooted in the Kashmir insurgency of the late 1980s, coinciding with the end of the Cold War and internal political challenges in India. Therefore, while nuclear weapons may encourage such tactics, they are not the only driving force. Surgical strikes, like Cold Start, might not completely deter proxies, but they provide a proportional way to respond.
Importantly, these strikes did not damage deterrence stability. They were executed well below thresholds that could lead to Pakistan’s tactical nuclear response, which is designed for conventional incursions. By signaling intent through diplomatic channels—India informed Pakistan’s military of the strikes afterward—and stressing their limited nature, escalation was avoided. Subsequent firings across the LoC in October 2016 were routine and did not indicate a larger conflict. This contrasts with hypothetical Cold Start scenarios, which could provoke nuclear first use, increasing the risks of accidental launches, especially concerning the security of tactical weapons.
Looking ahead as of early 2019, surgical strikes could become a standard response option for India. They could help rebalance the status quo without destabilizing nuclear deterrence. They address concerns of critics by showing controlled retaliation, potentially lowering incentives for provocative actions. However, stability requires additional efforts: confidence-building measures, dialogues, and international mediation to handle crises. Track-II diplomacy, arms control discussions, and economic ties could further strengthen peace.
This episode highlights essential principles of international security. Deterrence is not fixed; it evolves with strategies, technologies, and political contexts. South Asia's experience shows the importance of clear communication, strong command structures, and crisis management protocols to avoid miscalculations. For those studying strategy, it illustrates how the presence of nuclear weapons influences lower-level conflicts, echoing Cold War dynamics but adjusted for regional disparities.
In summary, while surgical strikes may not eliminate sub-conventional threats, their careful use can enhance deterrence by offering non-escalatory options. As South Asia navigates its nuclear era, promoting mutual understanding and restraint is crucial for lasting stability. This approach not only preserves peace but also enables both nations to focus on growth and prosperity, benefiting the region's billions.
Jammu and Kashmir
Kashmir Conflict
Military Strategy
National Security
Nuclear Diterrence
Pakistan
Regional Stability
South Asia
Terrorism
World Affairs
Tarik Aziz
Politically neutral Blogger exploring historical controversies. Political Science and International Relations aspirant, anti-extremism advocate, Educator (BA, MA Political Science, B.Ed), with skills in Web Development and MS Office.