The relationship between India and China, the world’s two most populous nations and nuclear-armed neighbours, has been defined for over seven decades by a mixture of cooperation, competition and recurring confrontation. As 2025 draws to a close, a fresh diplomatic incident involving an Indian citizen from Arunachal Pradesh being detained at Shanghai airport has once again highlighted the fragility of bilateral ties and the persistence of territorial disagreements that date back to the colonial era.
In October 2025, Prema Thomdak, a British national born in Arunachal Pradesh, was prevented from boarding an onward flight during a transit stop in Shanghai. Chinese officials declared her Indian passport “invalid” on the grounds that Arunachal Pradesh is regarded by Beijing as part of China (specifically “South Tibet” or Zangnan). After eighteen hours of detention and intervention by the Indian consulate, she was released. The Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs subsequently defended the action and reiterated Beijing’s longstanding claim over the entire state of Arunachal Pradesh. India responded with a formal démarche in both capitals and restated that Arunachal Pradesh is an “integral and inalienable” part of India.
This episode, while minor in itself, encapsulates the deeper structural tensions that have prevented normalisation despite numerous high-level summits, trade booms and confidence-building agreements. To understand why mistrust persists in 2025, it is necessary to examine the historical, geographical and strategic factors that continue to shape the relationship.
The Origins of the Dispute: The Unsettled Legacy of the McMahon Line
The core of the territorial disagreement lies in the 890-kilometre eastern sector of the boundary. In 1914, representatives of British India and Tibet drew what became known as the McMahon Line at the Simla Conference. Although Chinese delegates attended the talks, the government in Beijing never ratified the agreement and has consistently refused to recognise the line as legally binding. From China’s perspective, Tibet lacked the authority to negotiate boundaries independently, especially after Chinese forces reasserted control over Tibet in 1950–51.In the western sector, China occupies approximately 38,000 square kilometres of the Aksai Chin plateau, which India claims as part of Ladakh. Beijing constructed a strategic highway linking Xinjiang and Tibet through this area in the 1950s, a fact India discovered only in 1957. These two sectors – the eastern (Arunachal) and western (Aksai Chin/Ladakh) – remain the principal points of contention along the 3,488-kilometre Line of Actual Control (LAC), which has never been mutually demarcated.
Post-Independence Diplomacy: Idealism Meets Realpolitik
In the early years after independence, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru pursued a policy of friendship encapsulated in the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement, which recognised Tibet as an autonomous region of China. India hoped that mutual respect for sovereignty and non-interference would lay the foundation for peaceful coexistence. However, the agreement effectively removed India’s leverage on the Tibet question and gave China international legitimacy for its control over the region.Border tensions escalated throughout the late 1950s. India adopted a “forward policy” of establishing posts in disputed areas, while China consolidated control in Aksai Chin. Diplomatic efforts, including a 1960 visit by Premier Zhou Enlai to New Delhi, failed to yield agreement. China repeatedly offered an “east-west swap” – accepting the McMahon Line in Arunachal in exchange for recognition of its control over Aksai Chin – a proposal India rejected as it would legitimise the loss of territory occupied by force.
The breakdown culminated in the 1962 war, during which Chinese forces advanced deep into both sectors before unilaterally withdrawing from most of Arunachal but retaining Aksai Chin. The conflict left a lasting scar on the Indian psyche and froze bilateral relations for decades.
From Hostility to Cautious Engagement (1967–2000)
Sporadic clashes continued in the 1960s and 1970s, notably at Nathu La and Cho La in 1967 (where Indian forces prevailed) and at Tulung La in Arunachal in 1975. The late 1970s saw tentative diplomatic thawing as China shifted focus towards economic reform under Deng Xiaoping. Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi’s landmark 1988 visit to Beijing – the first by an Indian leader in 34 years – initiated confidence-building measures and led to agreements in 1993 and 1996 on maintaining peace along the LAC.The Vajpayee Era and the Tibet Concession
A significant milestone came in 2003 during Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s visit to China. India explicitly recognised the Tibet Autonomous Region as part of the People’s Republic of China and reiterated that anti-China political activities by Tibetans would not be allowed on Indian soil. In return, China acknowledged Sikkim as part of India, paving the way for the reopening of the Nathu La trade route. While the trade-off was presented as a pragmatic step, critics argued that India surrendered its last major diplomatic card on Tibet without securing reciprocal concessions on the boundary question.The 21st Century: Rising Power, Rising Friction
The rapid growth of both economies transformed the relationship into one of the world’s largest bilateral trading partnerships, reaching over US$130 billion by 2024. Yet economic interdependence has not translated into strategic trust.
Under President Xi Jinping, China has pursued a more assertive territorial policy across multiple fronts – the South China Sea, the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands with Japan, and the Himalayan border with India and Bhutan. Infrastructure development along the LAC accelerated, as did “salami-slicing” tactics: incremental encroachments designed to alter facts on the ground without triggering full-scale war.
Key flashpoints since 2010 include:
- 2013 Depsang incursion (Ladakh)
- 2014–15 Chumar standoff
- 2017 Doklam crisis on the India–Bhutan–China trijunction
- 2020 Galwan Valley clash – the deadliest confrontation since 1962, resulting in 20 Indian and an undisclosed number of Chinese fatalities
2025: Thaw and Immediate Chill
The Modi–Xi meeting on the sidelines of the BRICS summit in Kazan in October 2024, followed by restoration of direct flights and pilgrim access to Kailash Mansarovar, generated cautious optimism that relations were returning to a manageable equilibrium. Yet within weeks, the Shanghai airport incident and China’s renewed public assertion of claims over Arunachal demonstrated the limits of rapprochement.Simultaneously, satellite imagery revealed continued Chinese village construction near the LAC in Arunachal, a policy Beijing describes as poverty alleviation but which India views as an attempt to create permanent settlements in disputed areas.
Why Trust Remains Elusive – A Structural Analysis
Several interlocking factors explain the persistence of tension:- Asymmetric Perceptions of Status: China views itself as the pre-eminent power in Asia and regards India primarily as a regional rival rather than an equal. Beijing seeks to constrain India’s rise and prevent it from aligning too closely with the United States, Japan, and Australia through frameworks such as the Quad.
- Economic Leverage vs Strategic Vulnerability: India’s trade deficit with China (approximately US$100 billion annually) creates dependency on critical goods ranging from active pharmaceutical ingredients to electronics components. Beijing has occasionally used economic coercion as a diplomatic tool, though rarely overtly against India.
- The Utility of Ambiguity: An undemarcated boundary serves Chinese interests by allowing incremental advances and keeping India perpetually engaged in crisis management rather than long-term strategic planning.
- Domestic Political Imperatives: Nationalist sentiment in both countries limits leaders’ room for compromise. Any perceived concession on territory is politically toxic.
- Third-Party Dynamics: India’s growing partnerships with the United States and other Indo-Pacific nations are viewed in Beijing as containment efforts, prompting counter-measures along the Himalayan frontier.
Pathways Forward
Complete resolution of the boundary dispute appears unlikely in the near term. However, practical management mechanisms – regular corps-commander talks, hotline communication, and buffer zones – have reduced the risk of unplanned escalation since 2020.Longer-term possibilities include:
- A mutually acceptable framework agreement that clarifies claims without immediate demarcation.
- Enhanced economic cooperation in third countries (e.g., joint infrastructure projects in Africa or Central Asia) to build mutual confidence.
- Greater transparency on military deployments and infrastructure projects near the LAC.
Understanding this complex history is essential for policymakers, scholars, and citizens alike as both nations navigate an increasingly multipolar world. Only through sober recognition of each other’s core interests, rather than wishful thinking or ideological posturing, can the risks of miscalculation be minimised and the prospects for stable peace maximised.
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