On January 3, 2020, a U.S. drone strike at Baghdad International Airport killed Major General Qassem Soleimani, commander of Iran’s elite Quds Force and one of the most powerful figures in the Islamic Republic. The targeted assassination marked the most serious direct military confrontation between the United States and Iran since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Within days, tensions that had been building for years threatened to spiral into open war, drawing in regional powers, unsettling global energy markets, and raising difficult questions about international law, proportionality, and the future of Middle East stability.
The modern rivalry between Iran and the United States traces its origins to the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which overthrew the pro-Western monarchy of Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi and established an Islamic Republic openly hostile to American influence. The seizure of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran that same year and the 444-day hostage crisis severed diplomatic relations that have never been restored. Throughout the 1980s, the two countries fought a shadow war: Iran supported groups that attacked U.S. interests in Lebanon, while Washington backed Iraq during the brutal Iran–Iraq War (1980–1988).
Yet the most consequential chapter for the 2020 crisis began in 2015 with the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), commonly known as the Iran nuclear deal. Negotiated under President Barack Obama together with Britain, France, Germany, Russia, China, and the European Union, the JCPOA imposed strict limits on Iran’s nuclear program in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions. International Atomic Energy Agency inspectors verified Iran’s compliance multiple times between 2015 and 2018.
The agreement was controversial from the start. Critics in the United States, Israel, and several Gulf Arab states argued that it merely delayed, rather than permanently prevented, an Iranian nuclear weapon and failed to address Tehran’s ballistic-missile program or regional activities.
On May 8, 2018, President Donald Trump announced the unilateral U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA and the reimposition of “maximum pressure” sanctions aimed at reducing Iranian oil exports to zero and crippling its economy. Iran initially continued to comply with the deal’s nuclear restrictions, hoping European signatories would shield it from U.S. sanctions. When that effort largely failed, Tehran began a phased reduction of its commitments starting in May 2019, enriching uranium beyond agreed limits and reactivating centrifuges.
The period between mid-2019 and early 2020 witnessed a dangerous cycle of escalation in the Persian Gulf and Iraq. Attacks on international shipping near the Strait of Hormuz, the downing of a sophisticated U.S. surveillance drone by Iranian forces in June 2019, and strikes on Saudi Aramco oil facilities in September 2019—widely attributed to Iran or its proxies—brought the two countries close to the edge of direct conflict. Each incident was followed by restrained retaliation or none at all, suggesting neither side sought all-out war. That delicate balance shattered in late December 2019.
On December 27, a rocket attack on the K-1 military base in Kirkuk, northern Iraq, killed an American contractor and wounded several U.S. and Iraqi personnel. Washington attributed the attack to Kata’ib Hezbollah, an Iranian-backed Shia militia within the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), an umbrella organization officially part of Iraq’s armed forces. In response, U.S. forces conducted airstrikes on December 29 against Kata’ib Hezbollah facilities in Iraq and Syria, killing at least 25 fighters and wounding many more.
The strikes triggered angry protests in Baghdad. On December 31, thousands of mourners and militia supporters stormed the U.S. Embassy compound in the Green Zone, breaching outer walls and setting fires. Although the embassy itself was not entered and no American personnel were harmed, images of the siege evoked memories of the 2012 Benghazi attack and the 1979 Tehran hostage crisis. President Trump publicly warned that Iran would be held “fully responsible” and would “pay a very big price.”
Three days later, the United States made good on that warning in dramatic fashion. At approximately 1:00 a.m. local time on January 3, 2020, MQ-9 Reaper drones fired missiles at a two-car convoy leaving Baghdad airport. General Soleimani, who had arrived on a commercial flight from Damascus, was killed instantly along with Abu Mahdi al-Muhandis, the deputy head of Iraq’s PMF, and several others. The Pentagon described the strike as a “defensive action” ordered by the President to protect U.S. personnel, claiming Soleimani was actively planning “imminent” attacks.
Within Iran, Soleimani was not merely a military commander; he was a national icon. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei called him “the international face of resistance,” and millions mourned his death in massive funeral processions. To many Iranians, Soleimani had been instrumental in defeating the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria and defending Shia communities across the region.
In Washington and parts of the Arab world, however, he was regarded as the architect of Iran’s “forward defense” strategy, responsible for arming and directing militias that killed hundreds of American troops during the Iraq War and continued to target U.S. interests. The starkly divergent perceptions underscored a broader truth in international conflicts: one side’s hero is often the other side’s terrorist. The legal and political ramifications were immediate and profound.
The Trump administration justified the strike under Article II of the U.S. Constitution, asserting the President’s authority to defend American lives without prior congressional approval. Critics, including many Democratic lawmakers and legal scholars, argued that the operation constituted an act of war on Iraqi soil without Baghdad’s consent and violated both domestic and international law. On January 5, Iraq’s parliament passed a non-binding resolution calling for the expulsion of all foreign troops, a move that threatened the continued presence of approximately 5,200 U.S. service members training and advising Iraqi forces against ISIS remnants.
Iran vowed “severe revenge” but emphasized that its quarrel was with the Trump administration, not the American people. Supreme Leader Khamenei promised “forceful revenge,” while Foreign Minister Javad Zarif called the killing “an act of international terrorism.” In a symbolic escalation, Iran’s parliament designated the entire U.S. military a terrorist organization—mirroring Washington’s 2019 designation of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC).
Global markets reacted with alarm. Crude oil prices surged more than 4 percent in early trading on January 3 as investors feared disruption to the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, a chokepoint for roughly 20 percent of the world’s traded petroleum. Stock markets in Asia and Europe opened lower, and safe-haven assets such as gold and the Japanese yen rose sharply.
For countries heavily dependent on Middle East oil, the implications were particularly acute. India, which by 2019 had become the world’s third-largest crude importer, sourced nearly 18 percent of its imports from Iraq—more than from any other country. A wider conflict or new U.S. sanctions on Iraq could force New Delhi to seek costlier alternatives, potentially adding billions to its import bill and fueling inflation at home. Indian equity markets lost approximately ₹3 lakh crore ($40 billion) in market capitalization on January 3 alone.
The crisis also intersected with broader regional rivalries. Iran and Saudi Arabia, divided by sect (Shia vs. Sunni) and ideology (revolutionary theocracy vs. conservative monarchy), have waged proxy conflicts in Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq for years. The United States, a close ally of Saudi Arabia and other Gulf monarchies, found itself increasingly entangled in this cold war. The Soleimani killing risked pushing Iraq—already fractured along sectarian lines—closer to Iran and further from Washington.
By January 5, 2020, the world waited anxiously for Iran’s response. Intelligence reports suggested possible attacks on U.S. diplomatic facilities, military bases in the Gulf, or even cyber operations. There was fear that miscalculation by either side could trigger a rapid escalation neither truly desired.
Yet history offered some reason for cautious optimism. Both the United States and Iran had repeatedly stepped back from the brink in 2019. Tehran had exercised restraint after the drone shoot-down and the Aramco attacks, calibrating responses to avoid giving Washington pretext for war. The Trump administration, despite its hawkish rhetoric, had also refrained from large-scale military action even when presented with opportunities.
As the crisis entered its most perilous week since the 1979 revolution, the international community urged de-escalation. European leaders attempted to salvage what remained of the JCPOA and open diplomatic channels. Russia and China condemned the U.S. strike and called for restraint. The United Nations Secretary-General expressed grave concern and appealed for maximum restraint.
The events of early January 2020 did not occur in isolation. They were the culmination of decades of mutual distrust, compounded by the collapse of the nuclear accord and a series of tit-for-tat actions in multiple theaters. Whether the killing of General Soleimani would prove a decisive turning point toward détente or a prelude to wider conflict remained uncertain on January 5. What was clear was that the Middle East—and the world—had entered a new and dangerous chapter, one whose outcome would depend on the ability of leaders in Washington and Tehran to navigate the thin line between retaliation and catastrophe.
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