The geopolitical landscape of South Asia has long been shaped by the complex interplay between India and Pakistan, two nuclear-armed neighbours whose relations are marked by historical conflicts, territorial disputes, and ongoing tensions. As of 1 January 2019, the region continues to grapple with the challenges of maintaining deterrence stability amid asymmetric threats. One pivotal event in recent years that has prompted significant debate among scholars, policymakers, and security analysts is India's announcement of surgical strikes conducted across the Line of Control (LoC) in September 2016. These operations, carried out in response to a terrorist attack on an Indian Army base in Uri, represent a calculated military response aimed at addressing sub-conventional threats without escalating to full-scale conflict. This editorial examines the nature, objectives, and broader implications of these strikes in a neutral and educational manner, drawing on established theories of deterrence and empirical evidence from South Asian crises. By doing so, it seeks to illuminate how such actions might contribute to, rather than undermine, the fragile equilibrium of nuclear deterrence in the region.
To understand the significance of these surgical strikes, it is essential to first contextualise the concept of deterrence stability in South Asia. Deterrence stability refers to a state where nuclear-armed adversaries are dissuaded from initiating conflict due to the mutual assurance of devastating retaliation. In South Asia, this stability emerged prominently after both India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in 1998, overtly declaring their nuclear capabilities. Prior to this, the two nations had engaged in several conventional wars—in 1947, 1965, and 1971—each escalating from border skirmishes or territorial claims. The introduction of nuclear weapons altered this dynamic, creating a threshold beyond which escalation could lead to catastrophic consequences. However, this stability is not absolute; it is often described as precarious due to factors such as geographical proximity, unresolved disputes like Kashmir, and the asymmetry in conventional military strengths.
Proliferation pessimists argue that South Asia's deterrence is inherently weak. For instance, organisational biases within military structures, particularly in Pakistan where the army exercises significant control over nuclear assets, could lead to miscalculations or unauthorised actions. Similarly, strategic myopia—where leaders fail to anticipate the long-term ramifications of their decisions—has been cited as a risk factor. The stability-instability paradox further complicates matters: while nuclear weapons deter all-out war, they may encourage lower-level provocations, such as sub-conventional warfare, under the assumption that the adversary will not risk nuclear escalation. In this context, Pakistan's alleged support for militant groups operating in Kashmir and beyond has been viewed as a strategy to challenge India without crossing into conventional conflict. India, perceiving itself as conventionally superior, has historically sought ways to respond militarily while staying below Pakistan's nuclear red lines.
Adding to this complexity are the nuclear postures adopted by both nations. India's doctrine is based on credible minimum deterrence with a no-first-use policy, emphasising assured retaliation. Pakistan, conversely, has shifted towards an asymmetric escalation posture, reserving the right to first use, particularly through tactical nuclear weapons intended to counter limited conventional incursions. This evolution was formalised in Pakistan's full-spectrum deterrence policy announced in 2013, which aims to cover a range of threats from sub-conventional to strategic levels. Such postures create a layered deterrence framework, but they also heighten the risks of misperception and rapid escalation during crises.
Empirical evidence from post-1998 crises supports the existence of deterrence stability, albeit an unstable one. The 1999 Kargil conflict, where Pakistani forces infiltrated Indian territory, was contained without escalating to nuclear levels, partly due to international intervention and mutual nuclear fears. Similarly, the 2001-2002 standoff following the attack on the Indian Parliament saw massive troop mobilisations but no full-scale war, with diplomacy playing a key role in de-escalation. These events demonstrate that nuclear weapons have imposed restraint, preventing the kind of expansive conventional engagements seen in earlier decades. However, they also highlight the underlying instability: Pakistan's ability to pursue revisionist aims through proxies without facing severe reprisals has tilted the status quo in its favour, prompting India to explore new response mechanisms.
It is against this backdrop that India's surgical strikes of September 2016 must be analysed. On 18 September 2016, militants attacked an Indian Army brigade headquarters in Uri, Jammu and Kashmir, resulting in the deaths of 19 soldiers. Intelligence linked the attackers to groups based in Pakistan. In response, on 29 September 2016, India's Director General of Military Operations announced that the Indian Army had conducted targeted strikes on terrorist launch pads across the LoC in Pakistan-administered Kashmir. These operations involved elite commandos who crossed the LoC on foot, neutralised threats, and returned without engaging in prolonged combat. The strikes were described as precise, limited in scope, and aimed at preventing imminent infiltrations.
What distinguishes these strikes is their hybrid nature: they were overt in attribution, with the Indian government publicly acknowledging them, yet covert in execution, resembling special forces operations rather than conventional assaults. Unlike a full-scale invasion or even a limited war under doctrines like Cold Start—which envisions rapid, shallow thrusts by integrated battle groups—these strikes avoided mobilising large formations, artillery barrages, or air support that could signal broader intent. This controlled approach minimised the risk of misinterpretation as an existential threat to Pakistan, thereby reducing escalation potential.
To appreciate the educational value of this event, consider the broader spectrum of conflict in international relations. Conflicts can be categorised along a ladder: from sub-conventional (terrorism, insurgency) to conventional (armoured battles, air campaigns) to nuclear. Surgical strikes occupy a niche in what might be termed 'asymmetric conventional' actions—state-sanctioned, attributable operations that inflict targeted damage without committing to territorial gains or prolonged engagement. Historically, similar tactics have been employed globally; for example, the United States' Operation Neptune Spear in 2011, which eliminated Osama bin Laden in Pakistan, demonstrated how precision strikes can achieve objectives while managing escalation risks. In South Asia, while India claims prior covert operations across the LoC, the 2016 strikes' public disclosure added a political dimension, signalling resolve without provocation.
The objectives behind these strikes were multifaceted. Primarily, they aimed to neutralise immediate threats. Intelligence indicated a surge in militant gatherings along the LoC, poised for infiltrations into Jammu and Kashmir and potentially deeper into India. By preemptively dismantling these sites, India sought to disrupt planned attacks, thereby enhancing border security. Reports suggest the operations destroyed several launch pads and inflicted casualties on militants and their supporters, though exact figures remain unverified officially.
A secondary objective was punitive: to impose costs on Pakistan for its perceived role in sub-conventional warfare. This aligns with deterrence theory, where punishment deters future aggression by demonstrating consequences. In the wake of Uri, domestic pressure in India mounted for a response, amplified by media and political discourse. The strikes allowed the government to project strength, assuaging public outrage and reinforcing national morale. Politically, they were leveraged in domestic narratives, though this editorial maintains neutrality by noting that such actions are common in democratic systems where leaders respond to electorate sentiments.
Tertiary, the strikes served a deterrent function, aiming to discourage ongoing proxy activities. By crossing the LoC—albeit briefly—India signalled that sub-conventional threats would not go unanswered, potentially recalibrating Pakistan's risk calculations. This objective ties into India's long-standing quest for response options below nuclear thresholds. The Cold Start doctrine, conceptualised in the early 2000s, was an earlier attempt to enable limited conventional strikes, but it faced challenges from Pakistan's tactical nuclear developments. Surgical strikes, being even more restrained, offer a lower-risk alternative.
Evaluating the strikes' effectiveness requires a balanced assessment. On the immediate front, they appear to have succeeded in disrupting near-term threats, as evidenced by a temporary lull in major infiltrations post-operation. However, quantifying long-term impacts is challenging due to the opaque nature of intelligence. Regarding punishment, material damage to Pakistan was minimal—estimated at negligible financial or infrastructural costs compared to broader investments in militancy. Yet, the political and reputational effects were notable. Internationally, reactions varied: major powers like the United States and Russia expressed support for counter-terrorism efforts while urging restraint, while China voiced concerns over tensions. Neighbouring states such as Bangladesh and Afghanistan backed India's right to self-defence. Pakistan's denial of the strikes as mere cross-border firing failed to gain traction globally, indirectly tarnishing its image as a sponsor of terrorism.
Domestically in India, the strikes bolstered government credibility, contributing to political narratives during subsequent elections. However, this success must be viewed critically; over-reliance on such operations could politicise military actions, potentially leading to escalation pressures in future crises.
As for deterrence, the strikes' impact on Pakistan's sub-conventional strategy remains uncertain. Denials from Pakistan allowed it to avoid domestic backlash, preserving support for proxy elements. Figures like Hafiz Saeed continued inflammatory rhetoric, suggesting no immediate policy shift. Historically, sub-conventional warfare in South Asia predates nuclearisation, rooted in the Kashmir insurgency of the late 1980s, coinciding with the end of the Cold War and internal political issues in India. Thus, while nuclear weapons may embolden such tactics, they are not the sole cause. Surgical strikes, like Cold Start, may not fully deter proxies but provide a proportional response mechanism.
Crucially, these strikes did not undermine deterrence stability. They stayed well below thresholds that could trigger Pakistan's tactical nuclear response, which is geared towards conventional incursions. By communicating intent through diplomatic channels—India informed Pakistan's military post-operation—and emphasising the limited scope, escalation was averted. Subsequent cross-LoC firings in October 2016 were routine, not indicative of broader conflict. This contrasts with hypothetical Cold Start scenarios, which could provoke nuclear first-use, heightening risks of accidental or unauthorised launches, especially given concerns over tactical weapon security.
Looking ahead as of early 2019, surgical strikes could evolve into a standard response toolkit for India, offering a way to rebalance the status quo without destabilising nuclear deterrence. They address proliferation pessimists' fears by demonstrating controlled retaliation, potentially reducing the incentive for provocative needling. However, stability requires complementary measures: confidence-building, dialogue, and international mediation to manage crises. Track-II diplomacy, arms control talks, and economic interdependence could further solidify peace.
In educational terms, this episode underscores key principles of international security. Deterrence is not static; it evolves with postures, technologies, and political wills. South Asia's experience highlights the need for clear signalling, robust command structures, and crisis management protocols to prevent miscalculations. For students of strategic studies, it illustrates how nuclear shadows influence sub-threshold conflicts, echoing Cold War dynamics but adapted to regional asymmetries.
Ultimately, while surgical strikes may not eradicate sub-conventional threats, their judicious use strengthens deterrence by providing non-escalatory options. As South Asia navigates its nuclear era, fostering mutual understanding and restraint remains paramount to ensuring lasting stability. This approach not only preserves peace but also allows both nations to focus on development and prosperity, benefiting the region's billions.
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